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Abstract ERP studies commonly utilize gambling-based
reinforcement tasks to elicit feedback negativity (FN)
responses. This study used a pattern learning task in order
to limit gambling-related fallacious reasoning and possible
affective responses to gambling, while investigating rela-
tionships between the FN components between high and
low reward expectation conditions. Eighteen undergradu-
ates completed measures of reinforcement sensitivity, trait
and state affect, and psychophysiological recording. The
pattern learning task elicited a FN component for both high
and low win expectancy conditions, which was found to be
independent of reward expectation and showed little rela-
tionship with task and personality variables. We also
observed a P3 component, which showed sensitivity to
outcome expectancy variation and relationships to mea-
sures of anxiety, appetitive motivation, and cortical
asymmetry, although these varied by electrode location and
expectancy condition. Findings suggest that the FN
reflected a binary reward-related signal, with little rela-
tionship to reward expectation found in previous studies, in
the absence of positive affective responses.
Keywords Affect regulation  Decision making  Cortical
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Although being studied for over a century [1], reward-
based learning remains an area of investigation to help
understand human decision making. While some might
argue that understanding the cognitive aspects of this
process is unnecessary [2], reward learning inherently
requires an executive control cognitive process: online
monitoring of behavioral performance. A consistent view
of the systems thought to regulate decision making and
online performance monitoring includes the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) [3–5], basal ganglia [6], and prefrontal
cortex (PFC) areas as a network that performs planning and
complex decision making [7, 8]. Electrophysiological
investigations focused on this performance monitoring
commonly involve eliciting an event-related potential
(ERP) characterized by a negative deflection in the wave-
form over frontal scalp areas, termed the feedback nega-
tivity (FN), which is suggested as a component of a general
and flexible system involved in overall error-related pro-
cessing [9].
Source localization studies suggest the FN is generated
in the ACC [10–15], which is supported by functional
neuroimaging [16–21]. The ACC is a nexus of inputs and
outputs with links to numerous cortical and subcortical
structures, including being a portion of the limbic system
and having interconnectivity with many prefrontal areas
[22, 23]. Reinforcement learning (RL) theory proposes that
error-related ERP components reflect ACC responses
through its connection to the mesencephalic dopamine
system, via deviations from predicted expectations [24].
Many prefrontal cortex areas are also associated with
encoding of expectancy and reward outcomes, suggesting
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that cortical areas are involved in addition to the dopamine
reward system [8, 25–27]. Early studies suggested that the
frontal error ERPs corresponded only to valence of out-
comes [24, 28, 29], while later studies demonstrated that
both valence and magnitude of outcomes influenced FN
signals [15, 30–32]. Alternately, various studies have
shown that valence, magnitude, and probability are all
involved in prediction errors, or the difference between
expected and actual rewards, and that FN deflections are
related to the overall probability of reward outcomes [10,
16, 30].
The ACC is also directly involved in the conscious
experience of emotions [3], decision making related to
affective behaviors, affective motor programs [33] and as
the primary cortical area for both emotion reception and
emotional motor output [34]. The ACC is further impli-
cated as the affective processing center in that abnormal
ACC activity has been associated with depression, and that
depressed participants show abnormal responses to errors
within the rostral ACC [35], with attenuated FN responses
in severely depressed individuals [36, 37]. This implicates
the ACC in both general performance monitoring and
affective processing, and suggests that the FN may be
influenced by both bottom–up and top–down cognitive and
affective processes.
1.2 Feedback negativity and individual differences
While these basic cognitive and affective processes may
influence the expression of the FN, research on individual
differences in reward sensitivity has also been theorized to
play a role in general approach and withdraw behaviors and
responses to affective stimuli, which are linked to trait
levels of resting activation in the frontal cortices [38–40].
A number of studies have identified that frontal activity is
related to approach and withdraw behaviors and increased
responsiveness to valenced affective stimuli [39, 41–43].
Subcortical inputs from periaqueductal gray and septo-
hippocampal systems have also been posited to influence
reinforcement sensitivity via individual differences in a
behavioral activation system (BAS) and behavioral inhi-
bition system (BIS), leading to greater sensitivity to certain
types of stimuli and general response tendencies, shown
through surface level trait impulsivity and anxiety [34].
These effects may be evident in the BIS/BAS constructs
and their relationship to personality variables such as
impulsivity, reward responsiveness, and sensation seeking
and individual differences in risk taking behavior during
gambling tasks [44] and feedback negativity [45]. The
frontal asymmetry model shows some overlap with the BIS
and BAS model, but there is a significant disparity in that
measures of BAS and increased trait left frontal activity
show consistent agreement, while any links between BIS
and increased right frontal activity are less clear [38, 46–
49].
Many researchers have already completed significant
work on isolating factors influencing FN responses to
stimuli. Investigation of the ACC responses to feedback
commonly involves gambling tasks with expectancy
induced through variations in outcome probability [10, 27,
30, 50–53] with the FN showing larger amplitude respon-
ses for unpredicted outcomes [51]. Within many of these
studies, researchers used varying reward probabilities as an
index of reward expectancies, although there is consider-
able evidence that people do not have rational beliefs about
randomness, probabilities, nor gambling [54–56]. There are
even indications that the ACC is directly involved during
uses of fallacious reasoning [57]. Thus, we cannot simply
assume rational expectation of reward based on neither
previous stimulus reinforcement nor direct variation of
apparent probability, particularly within gambling type
tasks.
Bellebaum and Daum [10] found that the FN showed
increased amplitude with unexpected outcomes and the
magnitude between the expectation and actual rewards, but
that the effect did not appear until after the subjects suc-
cessfully learned the probability rule. Bellebaum et al. [30]
showed that the FN response coded for valence, magnitude
in the non-rewarded trials, and higher expectancy for those
learning the task and concluded that the FN coded the total
degree of departure from expectancy along all three ele-
ments (valence, magnitude, and probability). De Pascalis
et al. [46] found a relationship between the FN and BIS;
however, the task involved the continuous winning of
money and induced significant increases in positive affect
in all participants, being further enhanced in those subjects
reporting high reward responsiveness. Van den Berg et al.
[58] used a gambling task to elicit a FN, but found no
association between the FN and reward responsiveness,
while Lange et al. [45] found that FN elicited by unex-
pected outcomes was associated with higher BAS. More
recently, Bress and Hajcak [59] found that gambling-re-
lated FN amplitudes were larger for individuals with higher
self-reported reward sensitivity and behavioral reward
sensitivity on a signal detection task.
1.3 Hypotheses
The current study was proposed to contribute to this liter-
ature by allowing for investigation of the impact of
expectancy on amplitude of FN responses in relative iso-
lation from probabilistic-based task limitations, while
attempting to limit possible affective task responses. This
required subjecting participants to a boring pattern
response learning task. The induction of varying expec-
tancy, between high and low expectancy conditions, was
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based largely on presentation of the task as a simple
executive function (memory of small sequences). It was
hypothesized that participants would not demonstrate
affective response or report mood changes associated with
the task, and that the FN would not show a significant
negative deflection based on participant expectancy of
losses in the absence of task-induced affect responses.
2 Methods
2.1 Participants
Eighteen healthy, adult undergraduates (10 women) with a
mean age of 20.4 years (SD = 2.8) participated and were
provided class credit. All participants were right-handed
and reported normal or corrected vision with no history of
neurological or psychological disorders. Subjects were
rescheduled if they reported receiving less than 5 h of sleep
the night before, or reported use of drugs or alcohol within
48 h of the study, or report use of any other substance that
might interfere with alertness or electrophysiological
measurement. No participants reported symptoms sugges-
tive of problem gambling behavior on the South Oaks
Gambling Screen (SOGS) [60]. In order to limit any
monetary remuneration influence on participant selection,
only following reporting for the study and disclosing no
disqualifying information were participants informed that
they would be entered in a raffle for a $50 cash prize, with
their performance during the task determining the number
of entries. All participants provided written informed
consent prior to the study, which was approved by the
University and Medical Center Institutional Review Board.
2.2 Measures
Participants completed the Stroop Neuropsychological
Screening Test (SNST) [61] and confirmed non-impaired
ranges of incongruence processing and attention with
T scores from 42 to 99 (M = 72.44, SD = 22). Participants
also completed Carver and White’s [62] BIS and BAS
scales prior to psychophysiological recording. After
preparation for recording, participants completed two self-
report questionnaires measuring both trait and baseline
affect and anxiety consisting of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory—Form Y (STAI) [63] and the Positive and
Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS) [64]. The PANAS
measure was repeated following completion of the proce-
dure. Additionally, subjects were instructed to complete
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales measuring affect
and arousal, following completion of each six series within
the experimental procedure as an additional within-task
verification of affect and arousal response.
2.3 Procedure
Participants were briefed regarding the experimental pro-
cedures and were explicitly told that the correct choices
were not random, but came in four different response
patterns, and to utilize patterns to maximize winnings.
They were also informed that these patterns would shift
throughout the procedure. Participants were seated in a
dimly lit acoustically shielded room approximately 1 m
from a LCD stimulus display. They were instructed to limit
movement during baseline and task measurements, and
were verbally directed to close or open eyes for each
minute of baseline recording. Following baseline recording
procedures, participants were directed to comfortably
arrange a four key stimulus keypad in both hands, with
their thumbs positioned on the outside two of the four keys.
The stimulus display presented directions regarding the
responses, specifically to use the thumb of their left hand to
select the left card and the thumb of their right hand to
select the right card. Participants were given the opportu-
nity to conduct two practice series to familiarize them-
selves with the game. These series consisted of two trials
following the pattern of alternating win and loss feedback.
Each task trial totaled approximately 5 s in length, as
shown in Fig. 1, and began with a 1-s presentation of a
fixation point followed by the presentation of two textured
rectangles (roughly mimicking a playing card) equally
spaced horizontally on the LCD screen, which remained
until participants selected one of the two rectangles. Fol-
lowing selection, the fixation cross reappeared for one
second after which a feedback rectangle appeared, centered
on the LCD screen, filled green for win and red for loss
with the number of points won or lost centered in the
middle of the rectangle (?5 or -5). Feedback was pre-
sented for one second, followed by the reappearance of the
Fig. 1 Series of stimuli across task
It’s not what you expect: feedback negativity is independent 53
123
fixation cross for the next trial. However, following a shift
in correct response pattern, the feedback presentation was
followed by additional presentation of current total win-
nings and their difference from the average of all partici-
pants on that series presented in another rectangle for 1 s
each prior to the reappearance of the fixation cross. As the
task required little cognitive load, the scores showed little
variability with feedback of ?5 to -5 points of the average
presented in all cases, intended to limit any affective
response due to consistent wins experienced.
Each presented pattern consisted of a 2 trial learning
phase with mixed win–loss feedback, with a subsequent
period of 6–15 consistent wins based on randomly deter-
mined length of pattern repetition and participant perfor-
mance. This consistent period was designed to increase
expectancy of win feedback during the period, the middle
trial of which was taken to represent the high expectancy
win trial. Participants were given a loss feedback to signal
a pattern shift and represented the high expectancy loss
trial. The subsequent trials in which participants were
guessing the new pattern consisted of both win and loss
feedback, which represented the low expectancy win and
low expectancy loss trials. Variation between number of
trials per pattern and selection of the middle pattern trial
was conducted to prevent the possible confound of the
participants expecting a pattern shift in later win trials and
thus demonstrating decreasing win expectancy as pattern
shifts became more likely due to a high number of con-
sistent wins. Thirty pattern shifts were presented with an
average number of 13 trials per pattern and a total task time
of approximately 45.5 min, with five breaks following each
6 pattern shifts for SAM scale completion. Total participant
time burden was approximately 90 min.
2.4 Electrophysiological recording
Cortical electrical activity was recorded using Ag/AgCl—
sintered electrodes mounted in an elastic Quik-Cap
(Compumedics Neuroscan; Herndon, VA) at 32 scalp sites
using the international 10/20 placement system (Fp1, Fp2,
F7, F8, F3, F4, FT7, FT8, FT9, FT10, T3, T4, FC3, FC4,
C3, C4, CP3, CP4, TP7, TP8, T5, T6, P3, P4, O1, O2, Fz,
FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) with a ground electrode placed on
the frontal aspect anterior to electrode Fz, and referenced to
linked ears (A1–A2/2). The impedance of all electrodes
was maintained at less than 5 kX prior to acquisition.
Electro-ocular (EOG) activity and eye blinks were acquired
simultaneously and continuously using pairs of Ag/AgCl
electrodes placed lateral to the lateral canthus of each eye
for EOG, and placed superior and inferior to the center of
the left eye for eye blinks. All measurements were acquired
using a 40-channel NuAmps DC amplifier and NEU-
ROSCAN ACQUIRE 4.4 (Compumedics Neuroscan),
using a 512 Hz sampling rate within the 0.1–50 Hz fre-
quency band. EOG and eye-blink ocular artifact reduction
transformation occurred offline using a multiple lag time
domain regression analysis [65, 66].
EEG baseline was collected using eight 1-min record-
ings using alternating eyes-open and eyes-closed periods.
Following eye-blink and EOG corrections, each 1-min
period was transformed from the time to frequency
domains using overlapping 2.048 s epochs extracted
through a Hamming Window with contiguous epochs
overlapping 75 %, and then power spectra were calculated
using a fast Fourier transformation and summed across all
recordings as outlined in suggested recording guidelines
[67]. Total alpha power between 8 and 13 Hz was exam-
ined and assumed to be the inverse of cortical activity [40,
68]. Power spectral data were confirmed to be positively
skewed, prompting use of a natural log transformation to
normalize the spectral data prior to averaging across all
baseline measures. Asymmetry scores were computed as
ln(right)-ln(left) for each electrode pair, so that higher
scores are indicative of increased right alpha power and
thus inferred to represent greater left cortical activity [40].
ERPs were extracted from continuous measurements
using 1100 ms epoch windows, including a 100 ms pre-
feedback baseline and the 1000 ms following time locked
feedback presentation in the eye-movement corrected data
[69]. All files were digitally filtered using a 24 db low pass
filter and baseline corrected relative to the 100 ms pre-
feedback baseline. Time course windows for the FN were
determined relative to computed grand averages, as shown
in Fig. 2. The FN amplitudes were extracted as the most
negative peak in the time window between 225 and 325 ms
following feedback presentation. Grand average wave-
forms revealed an obvious large positivity occurring after
the FN-type response in the high win expectancy condition,
around 400 ms, and a large positivity occurring about
400 ms post feedback presentation in difference waves for
Fig. 2 Grand average waveforms for anterior midline electrodes
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both high and low expectancy conditions. Although not
planned a priori, this prompted further investigation of the
component, which was referred to as the P3 in subsequent
analyses. As there were no planned analyses for this ERP
component, it was decided to simply duplicate the analyses
selected a priori for the FN component.
Separate average waveforms were obtained for four
identified experimental conditions (High Expectancy Loss,
High Expectancy Win, Low Expectancy Loss, and Low
Expectancy Win). The High Expectancy Win condition
was taken from the fourth epochal feedback window during
consistent win presentation signaling correct pattern
establishment and, presumably, a higher expectation of
subsequent win feedback. The High Expectancy Loss
condition was taken from the epochal feedback window
following the first incorrect trial following consistent pat-
tern establishment, signaling a pattern shift to the partici-
pant. The Low Expectancy Win condition was taken from
the epochal window following the first correct trial fol-
lowing a pattern shift, while the Low Expectancy Loss
condition was taken from the window following the first
incorrect trial following the loss signaling a pattern shift.
3 Results
3.1 Demographics
Of the screening and collected demographic information,
only age and education level were significantly positively
related; this relationship was marginal (r = .476,
p = .046). Participant age was also found to be signifi-
cantly positively related to PANAS positive affect scores
assessed following completion of the task (r = .699,
p = .001). Stroop T scores were found to be significantly
positively related to STAI Trait Anxiety scores (r = .569,
p = .014).
3.2 Performance data
Participant average response times ranged from 416 to
629 ms (M = 498.7, SD = 61.78). Participant scores ran-
ged from 1635 to 1900 points (M = 1818, SD = 70.52),
but was negatively skewed (g1 = -1.717) due to the
presence of two outliers with a large number of response
time errors, defined as a subject response within 100 ms of
stimulus presentation, showing a positive skew (g1 =
1.961). Due to the departure from normality in the score
and response time errors accounting for almost all of the
score variance (r = -.971, p\ .001), overall score was
not utilized in later analyses. Due to the positive skew in
the response time error data, a log transformation was
utilized to induce normality. These log-transformed
response time errors were significantly related to an overall
tendency to respond quickly in pattern response decision
making (r = -.648, p = .004), and subject Stroop
T scores (r = -.564, p = .015), suggesting that these
response time errors may be a behavioral indicator of
impulsive responding. In addition, average response times
were significantly related to BAS-Drive (r = .524,
p = .025) and BAS Total (r = .484, p = .042) such that
individuals endorsing a high level of drive to achieve
rewards spent more time making response decisions, as
well as fewer errors (r = -.515, p = .029). Of note,
however, is that a high number of response time errors
were also related to increased baseline negative affectivity
(r = .590, p = .01), suggesting that perhaps individuals
presenting with higher state negative affect tended toward
lower overall investment in the task and/or more impul-
sivity in task-related decision making, which could also
explain the correlation between response time errors and
Stroop T scores reported earlier. For the anterior asym-
metry measures, only the F4–F3 electrode pair was sig-
nificantly related to response time errors (r = -.550,
p = .018) so that greater relative left frontal activity was
related to fewer response time errors.
3.3 Affective response to task
As the response pattern learning task with win feedback
consisting primarily of points was selected in an effort to
limit possible affective responses to the task, a number of
analyses were conducted to identify any within task affect
variation. Within subjects repeated measures ANOVA on
within task visual-analog scales indicated a significant
reduction in positive affect across the five blocks, F(4,
14) = 3.673, p = .009, MSE = 2.15, g2 = .21. A trend
analysis indicated that the data were well fit by a linear
model accounting for a significant portion of the variance
in affect (g2 = .19, p = .017). A second within subjects
repeated measures ANOVA on within task visual-analog
scale of arousal showed that arousal was not significantly
changed over the course of the task, F(4, 14) = 1.070,
p = .378, MSE = 2.06, g2 = .04. This suggests that our
task did not eliminate affective responses and somewhat
negatively affected overall subjective affect with a boring
task, while overall arousal was not significantly affected.
From the perspective of affect as two separate con-
structs, paired samples t tests on PANAS pre and post
measures revealed that positive affect was significantly
diminished over the course of the task, t(17) = 4.459,
p\ .001, d = 1.18, while negative affectivity increased,
but not to the level of statistical significance,
t(17) = 1.503, p = .151, d = 0.39. Although designed to
be affectively neutral, the pattern of significant affect
response to the task appears to be a decrease in positive
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affectivity, but not a significant increase in negative
affectivity or general arousal. As reported earlier, partici-
pant age was significantly positively related to PANAS
positive affect scores at posttest, but not at baseline. This
suggests that the older, more senior student participants
showed less of an emotional response to the task and
showed greater preservation of positive affect, possibly due
to greater acceptance of experiment participation in gen-
eral, and not simply due to the design of the task itself.
Regardless, these findings suggest that affective responses
may be having an effect on feedback processing.
3.4 ERP analysis
In order to determine if an FN response was induced
between positive and negative feedback, win and loss
grand average waveforms were created for each expec-
tancy condition. Paired t tests were conducted on the FN
amplitudes extracted for each of the frontocentral electrode
points. Difference waves were constructed as a subtraction
of the loss condition grand average minus the win condi-
tion grand average with a representative waveform for the
FCZ electrode shown in Fig. 3.
A negative deflection in processing of feedback was
found in the low win expectancy condition with amplitudes
being significantly lower for loss versus win feedback for
the FZ electrode, t(17) = 2.519, p = .022, SEM = 0.925,
d = 0.60, and for the FCZ electrode, t(17) = 3.041,
p = .007, SEM = 0.821, d = 0.72, but not for the CZ
electrode, t(17) = 1.994, p = .062, SEM = 0.887,
d = 0.48. Comparisons of component latency revealed no
significant differences between conditions for FZ,
t (17) = 0.173, p = .87, SEM = 9.64, d = 0.05, FCZ,
t(17) = 0.476, p = .640, SEM = 9.58, d = 0.12, or CZ,
t(17) = 1.963, p = .066, SEM = 13.13, d = 0.47. Thus,
the significant amplitude differences between the loss and
win feedback were identified in the more frontal electrodes,
with no differences in latency, suggesting an FN-type
response. Win and loss grand average waveforms were also
constructed for the high win expectancy conditions. There
was a negative deflection occurring in loss feedback pro-
cessing within the established FN time window: however,
amplitude differences were not statistically significant for
FZ, t (17) = 0.921, p = .37, SEM = 1.74, d = 0.22, for
FCZ, t(17) = 1.185, p = .252, SEM = 1.58, d = 0.28, or
for CZ, t(17) = 1.347, p = .196, SEM = 1.50, d = 0.37
suggesting that either a significant FN-type deflection was
not yielded, or no true FN was manifested in the high win
expectancy condition.
We tested our main hypothesis that the FN would not
show a significant negative deflection based on participant
expectancy of losses in the absence of task-induced affect
responses, through use of a one-sample t test on computed
FN amplitude difference scores (low win expectancy dif-
ference—high win expectancy difference), for the FZ,
FCZ, and CZ electrodes. As shown in Table 1, for all three
electrode sites, FN amplitude differences were not signif-
icantly different from zero.
3.5 Personality analysis
While the study was powered for the above ERP analyses,
exploratory analyses were conducted on personality mea-
sures to identify any additional indications of possible
associations with theorized motivation systems. As these
analyses suffer from reduced power, non-significant
Fig. 3 Difference waveforms for loss–win for low win expectancy
(top) and high win expectancy
Table 1 One-sample t tests of FN component difference scores
Measure Diff (lV) t value Sig (2-tailed) SEM
FN FZ .726 .496 .626 1.464
FN FCZ .637 .439 .666 1.451
FN CZ -.247 .178 .860 1.385
N = 18 for all analyses
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associations were not interpreted. With the BAS subscales,
the derived total score was significantly correlated with
only BAS-Drive (r = .820, p\ .001) and BAS Fun
Seeking (r = .650, p = .003), with BAS reward respon-
siveness being non-significantly negatively correlated with
BAS Fun Seeking (r = -.311), resulting in the BAS total
score being dropped from later analyses as it likely repre-
sented a non-unitary measure with limited interpretive
utility. Of the anterior alpha asymmetry measures, the F4–
F3 electrode pair was significantly correlated with scores
on the BAS-RR scale (r = .471, p = .048), suggesting that
overall greater left cortical activity is associated with
reward seeking behavior and increased reward sensitivity.
STAI trait anxiety scores were significantly positively
correlated with the Behavioral Inhibition Scale (r = .648,
p = .004). PANAS negative affectivity scores were also
significantly related to BIS scores (r = .571, p = .013).
Anterior alpha asymmetry was significantly related to
baseline state anxiety on lateral frontal electrodes
(r = -.648, p = .004) and negative affect (r = -.497,
p = .036), so that greater relative left frontal activity was
associated with decreases in both state anxiety and negative
affect at baseline, which is intuitive in light of the positive
relationship found of left frontal cortical activity and
measures of appetitive motivation. Not surprisingly, STAI
trait anxiety was significantly negatively correlated with
BAS Fun Seeking scores (r = -.517, p = .028), while
scores on behavioral inhibition were also significantly
related to BAS Fun Seeking (r = -.633, p = .005). STAI
state anxiety was significantly negatively related to base-
line positive affectivity scores (r = -.481, p = .043),
supporting the view of PANAS scores as a state variable.
3.6 Reward sensitivity/affect and ERPs
Higher P3 amplitude differences for the FZ electrode were
significantly related to higher trait anxiety (r = .474,
p = .047). While higher CZ amplitude differences were
related to higher scores on BAS reward responsiveness
(r = .518, p = .028), BAS-Drive (r = .718, p = .001),
and greater amounts of left cortical activity (F4–F3 elec-
trode pair, r = .540, p = .021). This seems to suggest that
the P3 component in the low expectancy condition is
related to more negative trait measures, while the midline
electrode differences were related to individual variations
in the positive trait measures reward responsiveness,
appetitive drive, and left cortical activity. In the high win
expectancy condition, amplitude differences for the FZ
electrode were significantly related to higher amounts of
left cortical activity (F4–F3 electrode pair, r = .547,
p = .019).
As FN amplitudes are hypothesized to be related to
measures of reward sensitivity, negative affectivity, and
frontal asymmetry measures in favor of greater relative
right frontal baseline activity, BAS reward responsiveness
and STAI scores were selected and entered simultaneously
into a multiple linear regression model for predicting FN
amplitude differences for those electrode locations identi-
fied as statistically significant in initial hypothesis testing
(low expectancy FZ and FCZ). In this case, none of the
personality models were significant. This suggested that the
FN was relatively independent of the measured personality
variables; however, due to the overall low power of the
analysis because of the small sample sizes needed for the
primary ERP analyses, and the higher chance of a type II
error, negative findings were not interpreted.
In addition, multiple linear regression models were
computed for predicting individual differences in the P3
response amplitude differences between the high and low
win expectancy conditions identified as significant in the
earlier hypothesis testing (FZ, FCZ, and CZ electrodes). If
the P3 differences were related to increased levels of affect
responses to the expectancy violations in the high expec-
tancy condition, as suggested by their correlations between
personality measures and cortical asymmetry scores, P3
amplitudes were hypothesized as being significantly pre-
dictable by a weighted linear combination of personality
scores.
Due to multicollinearity, F4–F3 was selected as an
anterior asymmetry predictor, STAI-T as a personality
predictor and baseline negative affect were selected and
entered simultaneously into the regression model, as shown
in Table 2. Of the predictor variables, only F4–F3
(p\ .01) and STAI-T (p\ .05) had significant zero-order
correlations with FZ P3 amplitude difference scores
between expectancy conditions, and both had significant
partial effects in the full model. The three-predictor model
was able to account for 60 % of the variance in P3
amplitude differences for the FZ electrode, F(3,
14) = 7.057, p = .004, g2 = .60. For FCZ, a model com-
posed of identical predictors was not as good a fit, but was
still able to account for 46 % of the variance in P3
amplitude difference F(3, 14) = 4.01, p = .03, g2 = .46.
When applied to CZ, the model fit was again reduced,
accounting for 27 % of the variance in P3 difference
amplitude, although this time the overall model was not
significant, F(3, 14) = 1.72, p = .209, g2 = .27. Overall,
this suggests that individual differences in P3 amplitudes
between the high and low expectancy reward conditions
may be predicted by personality variables related to cor-
tical asymmetry and negative affect, but that the model
shows a better fit with more anterior midline electrodes
than central midline electrodes. Thus, an individual’s state
negative affect and trait anxiety predicted more similar loss
processing between expectancy conditions, such that
unexpected and more expected loss–win feedback
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differences showed similar processing, while greater rela-
tive left cortical activity predicted greater differences in
feedback processing by expectancy conditions (i.e., that
unexpected loss feedback showed increased P3 amplitude
than more expected losses).
With the previous findings of the closer relationship of
more central midline P3 amplitude with measures of appet-
itive motivation, a separate regression model for predicting
CZ P3 differences was constructed and is shown in Table 3.
F4–F3 was retained from the previous model and had a non-
significant zero-order negative correlation with P3 CZ
amplitude difference (p = .30), while baseline negative
affect was replaced by baseline positive affect, which also
had a non-significant negative zero-order correlation with P3
CZ amplitude difference (p = .355), and trait anxiety was
replaced with BAS-Drive, which had a significant negative
zero-order correlation with P3 CZ amplitude difference
scores (p\ .01). The three-predictor model was significant
and was able to account for 42 % of the variance in P3
amplitude difference for the CZ electrode,F(3, 14) = 3.349,
p = .049, g2 = .42. This suggests that the P3 amplitude
differences for the central midline electrode showed little
difference between high and low expectancy conditions for
individuals with higher positive affect, higher drive to
receive reward, and increased left cortical activity.
4 Discussion
The major findings from this study support our initial null
hypothesis regarding FN amplitude differences; there were
no significant differences in amplitudes with varying levels
of win expectancy in a task without induction of positive
affect responses by a boring task without semblance of
gambling or monetary reward. Our findings support the
conceptualization of the FN as a phasic suppression effect
resulting from coding valence of outcomes as proposed in
early studies of feedback processing [24, 28, 29]. The
presentation of negative feedback in our fixed reward
magnitude task induced an FN-type negative deflection
occurring in the 225–325 ms post feedback time window.
However, as hypothesized, the FN amplitudes did not
significantly differ between high and low win expectancy.
This deviation from the previous literature, and resultant
hypothesis is based on the premise that previous studies
have not necessarily accounted for reward expectations and
affect response. Indeed, while previous studies have found
FN differences are related to objective reward probability
outcomes [10, 16, 30], and relationship to reward respon-
siveness measures [45, 59], the nature of these tasks sug-
gests that differences in FN responses could have been due
to other factors, such as subjective reward expectations not
matching objective probabilities due to fallacious reason-
ing, affect responses occurring following unexpected wins
or losses of actual money, or a higher reward salience of
more immediate reinforcement value in the feedback.
Moreover, our findings are similar to that reported by Van
den Berg and colleagues [58] who found no association
between FN and reward responsiveness in a gambling task.
Our task was not able to completely limit emotional
responsivity, demonstrated through an overall decrease in
subjective perception of affect through reduction in
Table 2 Individual differences
in FZ P3 amplitude difference
related to measures cortical
asymmetry, affect, and
personality (N = 18)
* p\ .05, ** p\ .01
Variable Zero-order r b sr2 B
STAI-T F4–F3 NA-PRE P3 DIFF
NA-PRE -.097 .17 .02 .260
F4–F3 -.263 .614** .64** .38 33.09
STAI-T -.045 .208 -.473* -.48* .21 -.427
Intercept = .198
Mean 34.17 .163 13.5 -5.46
SD 7.79 .133 4.53 6.92 R2 = .602**
Table 3 Individual differences
in CZ P3 amplitude difference
related to measures cortical
asymmetry, affect, and
personality (N = 18)
* p\ .05, ** p\ .01
Variable Zero-order r b sr2 B
BAS-D F4–F3 PA-PRE P3 DIFF
PA-PRE -.094 -.15 .02 -.22
F4–F3 .108 -.133 .07 .01 3.96
BAS-D .279 -.081 -.627** -.66** .39 -2.1
Intercept = 21.9
Mean 11.5 .163 32.06 -8.64
SD 2.431 .133 5.55 7.78 R2 = .42*
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positive affect in the participants. Although this was found
to be related to participant age and undergraduate class
status, the reduction in affect was not intended by our task
design. Although affect reduction limits our ability to
interpret the results as affectively neutral, it does allow us
to identify that violation of subjective reward expectations
did not lead to increases in FN amplitudes in the absence of
positive affective responses. This supports the previous
findings of reduced FN amplitude in tasks involving no
response choices and low subjective involvement in tasks
[52], and implicates the possible role of affective infor-
mation influencing overall ACC activation and FN
responsiveness in tasks likely to induce affective responses.
The overall reduction in positive affect might not suggest a
lack of motivation on the part of the participants, as par-
ticipant task-related accuracy was over 90 %, including the
trials where correct response patterns were not yet known.
Utilizing the personality and cortical asymmetry infor-
mation provides some insight into the relationships
between the ERP responses and behavioral markers theo-
rized to represent the functioning of underlying neurobio-
logical systems. The basic relationships between these
measures provided additional support to and replication of
previous research, as measures of appetitive motivation,
positive affect, and greater relative left cortical baseline
activation tended to positively correlate. Similarly, mea-
sures of inhibition and negative affect tended to positively
correlate and negatively correlate greater relative left cor-
tical baseline activation. Although none of the personality
or cortical asymmetry measures significantly related to FN
amplitudes, these analyses were underpowered and suggest
the need for additional research designed for individual
differences analyses. As we found significant relationships
between the P3 potential and these measures, these results
hint that FN within the pattern response learning task was
less strongly related to personality, cortical asymmetry, or
outcome probability and supports its role in signaling the
deviation from reward expectation, regardless of proba-
bility, to allow engagement of more adaptive response
strategies.
The surprising finding of positive deflection occurring
around 400 ms in the post feedback time window provides
some insight into interpreting the feedback-related pro-
cessing which occurred in the task. The ERP was signifi-
cantly different from zero in loss feedback processing in
both the high and low expectancy conditions, although
amplitudes were significantly higher for more unexpected
losses. This task design presented the high win expectancy
loss feedback as a single negative stimulus following a
string of highly expected win stimuli. Thus, this loss
feedback could have represented a novel stimulus that was
meaningful in the task as a signal of deviation from
expectancy, suggesting that this component represents a
P3b ERP component, as suggested by Donchin’s [70]
schema updating model. A second possibility is that neg-
ative feedback, particularly in the high win expectancy
condition, signals a need for stopping ongoing response
patterns, and that this component represents a need to
update response selection, which again would represent a
P3b type component, but closer to Verleger and colleagues’
[71] conceptualization of the P3b.
However, the presence of the significant component
during the periods of guessing new response patterns,
where the negative feedback occurred equally with positive
feedback, suggests that this component is not a classic
novel P3b response and may indicate other cognitive pro-
cesses. This would remain as a signal for needing to change
the response output initially selected to one that matches
the provided feedback pattern. A third possibility remains
that the presence of this component during differences
between the conditions may represent a trait response to the
more unexpected negative feedback.
When directly correlated with measures of personality
and affect, the low expectancy condition P3 amplitudes
were related to higher trait anxiety for the FZ electrode,
and low expectancy P3 amplitudes related to reward
responsiveness and increased drive to obtain reward for the
CZ electrode. With the functional divisions of the cingulate
cortex into anterior affective processing and dorsal
response selection processing, these relationships highlight
that the P3 component may reflect the summation of varied
processes. Specifically, that the anterior electrodes are
more closely related to a general tendency to experience
increased anxiety, while the more dorsal electrodes are
more closely related to variables that may impact response
selection, such as increased appetitive drive which would
presumably spurn greater focus on immediate response
selection in order to maximize rewards. However, for the
high expectancy condition, only higher relative left cortical
baseline activity was positively related to P3 amplitude for
the FZ electrode, which seems counterintuitive in that
anterior cingulate processing has been linked to negative
affective processing and greater left cortical activation has
been linked to measures of positive affect. This could
suggest that those participants who have a general
propensity for experiencing positive affect showed a
heightened negative response to more unexpected loss
feedback. However, without identifying the generator of
this component, these links with cingulate functional
division processes remain speculative.
Some additional support for the possible affective nature
of the P3 component comes from the reported multiple
regression models. The anterior midline electrodes showed
a good overall fit with a model consisting of a weighted
linear combination of measures of cortical asymmetry, trait
anxiety, and baseline negative affect, while more dorsal
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midline electrodes showed a good overall fit with measures
of cortical asymmetry, baseline positive affect, and higher
appetitive drive. While this does not suggest that a P3 type
cognitive process is not occurring, it does suggest some
individual differences in that process. If the P3 truly rep-
resents a context monitoring process, it appears that those
individuals with higher anxiety and negative affect show
reduced perception of differences in the subjective mean-
ing of the losses within differing contexts. If the P3 rep-
resents a response selection and initiation process, this
suggests that those individuals with a higher drive to
receive reward feedback react equally strongly to loss-re-
lated feedback, as each loss would signal a need to modify
planned response patterns in the current experimental
paradigm, regardless of the expectancy of the feedback
outcome.
Source localization techniques may aid in identifying
presumed locations of component generation, but were not
performed in the current study. While the FN has consid-
erable support for ACC generation, the P3 waveform
generated in the current study might have a different gen-
erator and reflect a different cortical process. While the
current study was originally designed to stabilize within-
task affect variation, affective measurements did not occur
throughout the task. Use of pre-post affect measurement
and periodic visual analog scales allowed for some infor-
mation concerning overall affect variation; no affect
responses were assessed on a trial-by-trial basis. Thus,
participants may have experienced within task affect
responsivity to consistent wins and unexpected losses,
which stabilized prior to the visual analog assessment.
Similarly, the current paradigm revealed some overall
reduction in positive affect that although supports the lack
of positive affect induced by the task, also suggests that our
results include unexpected error from the affect variation.
Future research may seek to utilize variations in task
design seeking to increase motivational salience without the
inclusion of gambling and direct monetary reward, in order
to further stabilize overall affect variation and allow more
specific findings regarding FN variation due to task-induced
affect responses. Future studies could attempt to directly
compare affective and non-affective inducing tasks with a
single participant group, looking for such FN variability.
Future studies may also attempt to identify if inducing a P3b
type response through a more classic oddball paradigm
shows similar relationships with affective measures and
cortical asymmetry. Finally, future research attempting to
stabilize affect responsivity could include trial-by-trial affect
assessment to verify that participant affect is not varying
significantly within trial blocks.
Overall, the current study could not directly relate FN
and P3 amplitudes to most measures of affective and cor-
tical asymmetry, and suggests that these components
predominantly represent basic performance monitoring
cognitive processes. Information regarding the differences
between high and low expectancy suggest that affective
states and traits and baseline asymmetry may predispose
differences in cognitive processing of loss-related feed-
back. The P3 showed sensitivity to participant win
expectancy, and showed some relationships to trait anxiety
and appetitive motivation measures, but these were more
pronounced for low win expectancy. Individual differences
in error-related processing were revealed in the differences
in P3 processing between the two conditions, such that trait
anxiety, state negative affect, and baseline cortical asym-
metry predicted differences in the cognitive processing of
loss-related feedback. This suggests that while the overall
amplitudes of the components reflect cognitive processes,
affective states seem to predispose some participants to
process loss-related feedback equivalently, regardless of
whether they perceived the losses as occurring while
guessing or occurring after the establishment of a learned
pattern of response.
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